{"id":51,"date":"2026-02-14T19:57:30","date_gmt":"2026-02-14T18:57:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sites.unica.it\/aok\/?page_id=51"},"modified":"2026-04-07T15:13:12","modified_gmt":"2026-04-07T13:13:12","slug":"events","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/sites.unica.it\/aok\/events\/","title":{"rendered":"Events"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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(4) “The Aesthetics of Knowledge” Seminar & Seminar of the PhD course in \u201cFilosofia, Epistemologia e Scienze Umane\u201d, organized by Filippo Contesi<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

22 May 2026, 15:00\u201317:00 (CEST)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tom Adajian (James Madison University), \u201cTruth, Aesthetic Goodness, and Ideal Sensibilities: Pragmatic Considerations\u201d; Aula 13 (Sa Duchessa Campus, Central Building, Cagliari) and accessible online<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Abstract: “Theories that analyze aesthetic goodness by appeal to an idealized agent (e.g., Hume’s “true judges”) are well-known. Common criticisms of such Ideal views include some that reject the notion of an ideal sensibility altogether, some that claim that a standard of taste so defined is “useless,” and some holding that such views are vulnerable to an aesthetic version of the Euthyphro dilemma. This paper (a) examines those criticisms and (b) defends a distinctive and underexplored pragmatist version of an Ideal approach, which aims at a unified account of truth and aesthetic goodness.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Contact: filippo.contesi@unica.it<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Past Events<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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